As my “Election 2024” blogging project came to a natural end in mid-November, I had been thinking we were likely about to enter an extremely eventful period in American history, and that it therefore would be fruitful to document events under the “Trump 2.0” administration as they happen. What I had in mind was something like a daily journal, but trying to focus on the factual record as it evolves. However my professional life gets extremely busy in January, and the news started coming at an almost unbelievably fast pace, so the project did not get off the ground in a timely manner.
This week marked the 100-day mark of Trump’s second term, as well as the time of year when the end of my busy season is in sight. As such it is now more practical for me to carry on with my original concept. However in order to provide a modicum of context for what will come, I somehow need to try and summarize the Trump 2.0 administration so far, at least in its major themes. That is a daunting task and I imagine I will look back on this post over time and say “I forgot about X, and Y, and…” Still one must start somewhere.
DOGE. During the campaign, two of Trump’s richest surrogates — Elon Musk, and Vivek Ramaswamy — had announced that during a second Trump they would head up an informal Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE (a name that pays homage to the original crypto memecoin, Dogecoin, of which Musk is a known supporter). The stated objective of DOGE during the campaign was as a means for finding material savings in the federal government budget, although it was unclear at the time what form the effort would take. Personally I thought it was a vague, feelgood campaign promise, rather than anything that would actually manifest itself post-election.
Well, I was wrong about that. Vivek left the effort before the inauguration in order to launch a campaign for Ohio Governor in 2026. But Musk jumped all-in to DOGE, serving as a “Special Government Employee” during the first 100 days of Trump’s term (albeit without making any of the usual financial disclosures or paying any attention to myriad conflict-of-interest issues), and at times seeming like he was, at a minimum, the co-President. It appears he is about to return his full attention to his business interests, which I’m sure his stockholders would appreciate (Tesla stock is down 29% over the first four months of 2025, and his involvment with Trump and DOGE has poisoned the Tesla brand in many circles, both domestic and foreign).
I think as a nation we will be coming to terms with the implications of DOGE for many years to come. Musk, given what appeared to be unlimited access to and ability to influence government operations, took the same “move fast and break things” approach that he took to Twitter. DOGE made widespread buyout offers to federal employees that didn’t comply with established processes; purported to fire all federal employees that were within their one-year probationary period, without regard to their individual job performance; immediately turned off funding for a variety of federal programs, even with respect to funds that had already been appropriated but were not yet disbursed; and eviscerated a number of federal agencies, particularly ones who had made inquiries into Musk’s own business activities (like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) or are otherwise seen by MAGAworld as antithetical to “American interests” (like the U.S. Agency for International Development). In the name of “government efficiency,” DOGE has done quite a bit to reduce government effectiveness while making only a very small dent in the overall cost of government.
And all of this happened with nary a peep from…
Congress. Recall that the result of the 2024 House election was a 220-215 Republican majority. However, Gaetz resigned from Congress in mid-November after Trump named him as the nominee for Attorney General, and even though his nomination fell apart before the new Congress was installed he declined to take his seat. As such the Congress started at 219-215 Republican. That was enough, barely, to allow Mike Johnson to survive a speakership vote: three Republicans originally voted against him but two switched their votes back before the window closed.
Since then, Rep. Waltz of Florida resigned to become National Security Advisor, and Republicans were elected to replace both Gaetz and Waltz, albeit with significantly reduced majorities: Gaetz’s seat went 57-42 Republican, compared with 66-34 in November; and Waltz’s seat went 57-43 Republican, compared with 66-34 in November. The narrowing of those elections spooked Republican leadership, convincing Trump to withdraw the nomination of Rep. Stefanik to be U.N. Ambassador out of fears the party might not be able to hold an upstate New York district that Trump won 60-39 in November. Two Democrats have also died early in the term and have yet to be replaced, making the current margin 220-213 for the Republicans.
However, Congress has done very little in the first 100 days, reflecting Trump’s modus operandi of simply acting without new Congressional authority, contorting existing law in radical ways. About the only piece of legislation they have enacted was a bill in March to avoid a government shutdown; this required cooperation of several moderate Democratic Senators, including Minority Leader Schumer, who apparently calculated that Trump and DOGE would be able to do even more damage during a government shutdown by selectively deciding which parts of the government to re-open. Still, those Senators’ capitulation has created a lot of ill will on the left wing of the Democratic party, who are now encouraging Rep. Osario-Cortez to consider primarying Schumer in 2026: a poll in early April had AOC ahead of Schumer in a primary race, 55-36.
The Democrats have been strangely silent, for the most part. Sanders and AOC have attracted some large crowds in swing states, and very recently Illinois Governor Pritzker gave a speech calling for mass protests and disruption. In other Democratic news: Buttigieg has declined to run for an open Senate seat in Michigan in 2026, presumably keeping his powder dry for a presidential run in 2028; Maryland Governor Moore recently took himself out of consideration for the 2028 primary; and Kamala has yet to decide whether she will run to replace California Governor Newsom, who is term-limited, in 2026 or instead keep her powder dry for 2028.
Congressional activity is likely to heat up soon as they plot the path towards a new tax bill, with the TCJA’s key provisions set to expire at the end of 2025. But in the meantime, about all Congress has done is rubber stamp Trump’s choices for…
Cabinet. While Gaetz’s bid for Attorney General died on the vine, all of Trump’s other choices for Cabinet were confirmed by the Senate. Which is quite remarkable, given how profoundly unqualified most of them were. Rubio for Secretary of State was the least controversial pick, and indeed he was unanimously approved. Also comparatively uncontroversial was hedge fund titan Scott Bessent’s nomination as Treasury Secretary, making him only the 2nd openly gay Cabinet member (after Buttigieg).
But after that the quality of key nominees was dismal: RFK Jr. for Health and Human Services (with Dr. Oz as head of CMS), former Florida AG Pam Bondi for Attorney General, Kash Patel for FBI Director, Tulsi Gabbard for Director of National Intelligence, Kristi Noem for Director of Homeland Security, and former Fox News host Pete Hegseth for Defense Secretary. Hegseth attracted opposition from not only Collins and Murkowski, but also McConnell (who has since indicated he will not run for re-election in 2026); however Vance provided the tie-breaking vote. The fact that Senator Joni Ernst, the first female combat veteran elected to the Senate, was willing to support a nominee who (in addition to being unqualified) firmly believes that women should not serve in combat roles is indicative of the lock that Trump — and Musk or, more accurately, the fear of Musk’s money being thrown at a primary challenger — has on today’s Republican party.
So far the Cabinet has been holding together, in spite of…
Signalgate. In one of the craziest political scandals of all time, in early March NSA Waltz accidentally invited journalist Jeffrey Goldberg to a group chat on the Signal app, in which VP Vance and several Cabinet members were openly discussing plans to bomb targets in Yemen using non-government communication channels. Goldberg originally was coy about the details shared on the chat but, after the administration denied that classified information was transmitted, shared his receipts. In particular, Secretary Hegseth was very open on the Signal chat about the specific timing of when and how attacks would occur, a couple of hours in advance.
Interestingly, the Signal chat was set up to disappear after a certain interval, raising the very likely prospect that administration officials are routinely communicating on Signal as a means of avoiding record-retention statutes. It is rich to see this type of scandal occurring in the administration of the man who rode a scandal involving Hillary’s email server to the White House in the waning days of the 2016 campaign.
Of course Trump, in his usual fashion, refused to admit that anything was wrong here. Having said that, Hegseth may yet find himself without a job; and within the time that I’ve been drafting this post, it has been announced that Waltz is leaving the NSA post to replace Stefanik as the nominee to be U.N. Ambassador. Which brings us to…
Foreign Policy. Oh, boy.
Trump had said during the campaign that he would bring the Russo-Ukraine War to end “on day one”. That hasn’t happened. What has happened, however, is the U.S. effectively taking Russia’s side with respect to the origins of the conflict and the conditions for peace, most recently with the suggestion that Ukraine will need to recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea as part of a peace deal. While NATO still exists in name, the U.S. is widely seen by Europe as having in effect walked away from the aims of the coalition, unwinding eight decades of foreign policy in a matter of weeks. This has created considerable re-thinking of priorities within the European Union.
But that’s far from the only major foreign policy development of the Trump turn. During the interregnum, Trump started making repeated comments about several foreign policy issues that were not mentioned at all during the presidential campaign: re-asserting U.S. authority over the Panama Canal; annexing Greenland; renaming the Gulf of Mexico to be the Gulf of America; and, to my horror, annexing Canada. The latter issue started with repeated social media references by Trump to “Governor” Trudeau and calling Canada the “51st State”. However as time marched on, these references felt less like Trump’s trademark namecalling and more like the vanguard of a new and aggressive attitude towards the northern neighbor.
The crisis with Canada started in earnest shortly after the inauguration when Trump initiated a trade war with both Canada and Mexico, violating the terms of the USMCA trade agreement that he himself instigated and signed during his first presidential term. The new trade war exploited Presidential powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and as such Trump needed to pretextually create an emergency with Canada, which he did by citing “sustained influx of illicit opioids and other drugs at the Canadian border.” This declaration flew in the face of data indicating that only a miniscule fraction of fentanyl enters the U.S. via Canada, and more actually flows the other way.
The poisoning by Trump of U.S.-Canada relations has had an immediate and profound effect north of the border, not just with respect to Canadian attitudes towards the U.S., but also with respect to domestic politics. At the beginning of the year, it seemed virtually certain that Pierre Polievre’s Conservatives would soundly defeat Justin Trudeau’s Liberals in a federal election to take place sometime in 2025. Instead, Trudeau resigned and was replaced by former central banker Mark Carney, who led the Liberals to victory in a federal election last week, with Polievre (a MAGA wannabe) losing his own seat.
But the trade wars continue, not just with the nation’s nearest neighbors but via…
Global Tariffs. During the campaign Trump repeatedly talked about how “tariffs” was his favorite word in the English language, and harkened back to the McKinley administration. With the Mexico-Canada trade war as a prelude, Trump announced that April 2nd would be “liberation day”, in which he imposed a new tariff regime to restore American greatness. The resulting tariffs, which were in full effect only temporarily, increased average tariff levels tenfold over what had been seen in recent years and to levels higher than those that pertained under the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff bill in the Hoover administration, back when international trade represented only 3% of GDP instead of today’s 11%.
The stock market and bond market both went ballistic, leading Trump to eventually put a pause on many but not all of the new tariffs. In recent days the stock market has recovered all of the considerable ground lost during the chaotic early days of April; but policy uncertainty remains immense, and the ultimate impact on the economy is extremely murky but unlikely to be a net positive.
You might ask yourself, doesn’t our Constitution specify that Congress is in charge of tariff policy? Yes, which brings us to…
Presidential Maximalism, Retribution, and Lawlessness. Trump has taken a strongman approach to governing, with vast numbers of executive orders. Some of them, like declaring an end to birthright citizenship, are in direct tension with the Constitution and settled SCOTUS case law. Others, like the Gulf of America renaming, or a very recent order that Alcatraz be re-opened as a prison, are pretty silly in the grand scheme of things.
Many others reflect Trump’s campaign vow to take retribution on his perceived opponents. This now includes a number of major law firms targeted by specific executive orders, some of which have bent the knee, others of which are suing. It also includes many major universities, with Trump having cut off federal funding to Columbia and Harvard on grounds of “anti-semitism”. Columbia bent the knee; Harvard sued. Very recently, Trump has ordered the IRS to take away Harvard’s tax-exempt status.
But many of the Trump administration’s actions are rooted in a hyper-aggressive use of authority granted to the President under existing statutes. I referred above to the contrivance of a “national emergency” involving the Canadian border in order to invoke authorities under the IEEPA, to launch the trade way with Canada. Another important example involves the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, used to justify some of Trump’s actions in the area of…
Immigration Policy. This was obviously a key issue in the campaign. A lot has been happening here, including the secret revocation of student visas for students with pro-Palestinian views (using authority granted to the Secretary of State to declare that it would be contrary to foreign policy interests for an individual to be allowed into the country), followed by ICE agents making raids to pick up people for “overstaying their visa” when neither they nor their university had knowledge that the visas had been revoked.
A main flashpoint involves the deportation of various individuals to, among other places, a notorious El Salvadoran prison, without access to due process. (I won’t get into the Abrego Garcia case in detail here, but I imagine it will come up in the sequel.) Among other things, Trump has invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to declare that a Venezuelan gang named Tren de Aragua has “invaded” the U.S., and then uses that declared “invasion” as justification for deporting suspected TdA members without due process. Vast numbers of cases are working their way through the legal system, and Trump has recently made comments to the effect that he doesn’t believe these people ought to be entitled to due process.
The main concern the Trump approach is raising in many quarters boils down to, what is the limit? If due process does not hold here, then what due process would be afforded if Trump were to, mistakenly or intentionally, deport a permanent resident or even a citizen to an El Salvadoran prison? If Trump is willing to revoke student visas in secret, could he be stopped from revoking previous naturalizations? Already there have been reports of situations where a migrant mother was summoned to meet with government officials and was specifically told to bring her citizen children with her, and then mother and children were removed from the country without being afforded the opportunity to have the children remain in the U.S. with relatives.
As Jack McCoy said to SCOTUS long ago in an episode of Law & Order: “Man has only those rights that he can defend. Only those rights.”
Lastly, we also have a vast aura of…
Corruption. It’s hard to know where to start here.
There was the presidential inauguration, in which Trump raised far more money than had ever been raised before, and where it’s unclear where much of that money ultimately went. It was telling that our oligarch class – Musk, Jeff Bezos, Tim Cook, etc. – had better seats at the inauguration than most Republican politicians.
There’s Musk’s role in DOGE, where not only did he not make any pretense to avoid conflicts with his business interests, but arguably he advanced his business interests in many ways via the actions he spearheaded.
There’s Trump’s approach to crypto (de)regulation, coinciding with the launch of various Trump crypto ventures, which on paper have reportedly increased his family’s wealth by $2.9 billion in the last few months. (Emoluments clause? What emoluments clause?)
There’s Trump’s politicization of the Department of Justice, an example of which is the DOJ’s action to dismiss corruption charges against NYC Mayor Adams. This is widely believed to have been a quid pro quo to get Adams’ cooperation with Trump’s immigration policy. Several DOJ prosecutors resigned over the matter. Whereas originally the DOJ was holding the possibility of reinstating the charges over Adams’ head, a judge ruled that the case needed to be dismissed with prejudice instead, so that the threat of renewed prosecution could not be used by the federal government as leverage over Adams.
There’s Trump’s use of the pardon power. He pardoned the creator of ‘dark web’ marketplace Silk Road who was serving life without parole, a cause celebre among libertarians; he pardoned former Illinois Governor Blagojevich, whose sentence he had commuted during his first term; he pardoned the former CEO of electric truck company Nikola, who had donated $1.8 million to Trump’s campaign; he commuted the sentence of former Ozy Media CEO Carlos Watson while he was en route to start a 10-year sentence for fraud. In short, he has taken aggressive action to unwind previous DOJ actions to combat political corruption and white-collar crime. (And, of course, he issued a blanket pardon to all of the January 6th rioters.)
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In short, times are not good. Despite Trump’s frequent disavowals of “Project 2025” during the campaign, a whole lot has happened so far that is straight of the Project 2025 playbook. From my perspective, the damage done so far to America’s standing in the world appears irreparable, and the damage done domestically to the rule of law and the functioning of good government is likely to take decades to repair, as a best case. And that’s presuming that the judiciary can and will ultimately remediate much of the damage, and that we will continue to have free and fair elections in 2026 and 2028 with the electorate repudiating Trump’s movement; but there is considerable risk that won’t happen.
I should add that there are certain of Trump’s aims to which I am not ideologically opposed: Immigration policy and enforcement in the U.S. needs improvement, and I can see the appeal of a less globalist approach to trade. Once can also argue, reasonably, that the federal government does too many things and some of them ought to be re-thought. (I tend to take the flip side of that coin myself, namely that we leave far too much to the vagaries of the private sector; but, there are arguments to be had here.) However, given his nature Trump is an incredibly imperfect vehicle through which to try and address any of these complex and nuanced issues. Which leaves us, all too predictably, with chaos.