Over the course of the week, the House has been going through the often symbolic process of having various Committees approve different components of what will eventually become a massive budget reconciliation bill, so that the Budget Committee can approve the omnibus bill and send it to the full House. The intent was for Budget Committee approval to occur today, thus teeing things up for the full House to pass a bill and send it on to the Senate prior to the Memorial Day weekend.
However things took an unexpected turn today, as the vote in the Budget Committee failed, with four conservative Republicans voting against it. The bill, officially known for now as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), combines the tax bill coming out of Ways & Means with various other bills directing spending cuts, most prominently with respect to Medicaid. The conservatives’ objection is that OBBBA doesn’t do enough to trim spending. As an example, while they support OBBBA’s addition of an 80-hour-per-month “community engagement” (i.e., work or community service) requirement for otherwise eligible childless adults to get Medicaid coverage, the dissenters criticize the fact that (for political reasons, presumably) OBBBA doesn’t implement that change until 2029.
As such there is now talk of another Budget Committee vote on Sunday night, in order to try and get things back on track. But keep in mind that once OBBBA makes it to the full House, there is still the potential that moderate Republicans will revolt over the approach taken to the SALT deduction; and once the bill makes it to the Senate, there is the potential that Senator Hawley and other Republicans will object to the magnitude of Medicaid cuts. On the other hand, with the TCJA’s tax cuts expiring after 2025, there is great pressure on the Republicans to do something they deem constructive, given their unified control in Washington.
Moving back to the legal world, SCOTUS issued an opinion today in a case that came up through the shadow docket and that relates to a controversial Trump executive order–but it wasn’t the case we discussed yesterday about birthright citizenship. Instead, today’s decision is the second one issued by SCOTUS in a case with the confusing caption of A.A.R.P. v. Trump, where here “A.A.R.P.” refers not to the advocacy association for retirees but rather the initials of a Venezuelan individual currently being detained by ICE.
The underlying issue in A.A.R.P. v. Trump relates to a March 2025 proclamation by Trump declaring that a Venezuelan gang, Tren de Aragua (TdA), “is perpetrating, attempting, and threatening an invasion or predatory incursion against the territory of the United States [and] is undertaking hostile actions and conducting irregular warfare against the territory of the United States both directly and at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime in Venezuela.” By characterizing TdA’s activities in the U.S. as an “invasion” taking place “at the direction” of the Venezuelan government, Trump is asserting that TdA members present in the U.S. are “alien enemies” as defined by the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 (AEA). This is relevant because the AEA authorizes the apprehension and removal of “alien enemies” (assuming they are at least 14).
As a result of the proclamation, the administration has been rounding up and detaining suspected TdA members, and has already managed to deport some of the detainees to El Salvador, where they are imprisoned pursuant to a deal that Trump struck with the El Salvadoran government. Reportedly, they have been using a scoring checklist, which includes various types of tattoos that purportedly signal connections to TdA, and concluding that an individual is putatively a TdA member if they score high enough on the checklist. This has led to accusations that some of the detainees identified as TdA members actually have no ties to TdA.
This situation raises a host of issues. First and foremost is the question of whether Trump’s proclamation has any basis in fact: Should TdA members in the U.S. be treated as “alien enemies”–or, put differently, does TdA’s activity in the U.S. constitute an “invasion or predatory incursion” in the sense of the AEA? This appears to be extremely questionable, although the administration is adamant that the judiciary should have no role in second-guessing the executive’s foreign policy judgment to declare what does or does constitute an “invasion” for AEA purposes. But there is also the question of due process: To the extent an individual has been identified by the government as an alien enemy and the government wishes to remove that individual from the U.S., what notice does the alien need to receive and what ability does the alien have to challenge the government’s determination prior to removal?
The A.A.R.P. v. Trump case has its origins about a month ago, when the ACLU became aware that preparations were being made to deport a set of Venezuelan detainees from Texas to El Salvador. In a procedurally extraordinary state of events, the case went from district court to the 5th Circuit to SCOTUS within 24 hours, resulting ultimately in a 7-2 SCOTUS order issued shortly before 1am on a Saturday morning. That order, which we’ll call A.A.R.P. I, directed the government to not deport any of the potentially impacted individuals until further notice. Reportedly, there were Venezuelan detainees in a bus on its way to an airport at the time SCOTUS issued its order, underscoring the need for extreme speed here. (In an earlier similar ACLU case, J.G.G. v. Trump, the government got planes to El Salvador into the air before a federal judge was able to enjoin the government from deporting the plaintiffs.)
Today’s SCOTUS opinion, which we’ll call A.A.R.P. II, also appears to have been 7-2 (the dissenters in both cases having been, perhaps predictably, Alito and Thomas), and grants the plaintiff’s desired injunction to prevent their deportation pending further legal proceedings. But just to be clear, at this stage the legal issues at hand involve the second issue above–due process around the notice that needs to be given before removal–and not the core issue of whether TdA is really “invading” the U.S. Quoting from today’s unsigned opinion:
“To be clear, we decide today only that the detainees are entitled to more notice than was given on April 18, and we grant temporary injunctive relief to preserve our jurisdiction while the question of what notice is due is adjudicated. We did not on April 19—and do not now—address the underlying merits of the parties’ claims regarding the legality of removals under the AEA. We recognize the significance of the Government’s national security interests as well as the necessity that such interests be pursued in a manner consistent with the Constitution. In light of the foregoing, lower courts should address AEA cases expeditiously.”
To that end, SCOTUS remanded the case to the 5th Circuit with fairly specific instructions as to what legal issues that appellate court ought to address, before the case inevitably returns to SCOTUS. One justice, Kavanaugh, wrote a concurrence suggesting that SCOTUS ought to have taken more direct action:
“The circumstances call for a prompt and final resolution, which likely can be provided only by this Court. At this juncture, I would prefer not to remand to the lower courts and further put off this Court’s final resolution of the critical legal issues. Rather, consistent with the Executive Branch’s request for expedition—and as the detainees themselves urge—I would grant certiorari, order prompt briefing, hold oral argument soon thereafter, and then resolve the legal issues.”
I’ve commented on multiple occasions before that one of the difficulties involved in trying to predict SCOTUS actions is the information asymmetry caused by the fact that the members of the Court know what positions they have taken on cases for which the opinions are not yet final and public. In particular, it will be interesting to see whether pundits’ views of what SCOTUS is likely to do in Trump v. CASA shift somewhat now that we know what SCOTUS has done in A.A.R.P. II.