Category Archives: Politics

Election 2020: Day -2

This morning the New York Times released new polls of four key states, and they are all both consistent with established wisdom about the state of the race in those states, and encouraging for the Democrats:

  • Arizona: Biden 49, Trump 43
  • Florida: Biden 47, Trump 44
  • Pennsylvania: Biden 49, Trump 43
  • Wisconsin: Biden 52, Trump 41

Along similar lines, this morning the latest NBC News/Wall Street Journal national poll came out: Biden 52, Trump 42.

One interesting thing to note about this year’s polls is how few undecided votes there are. For instance, as Chuck Todd observed this morning on Meet The Press, four years ago the NBC/WSJ national poll on day -2 was Clinton 44, Trump 40.

I think this reflects several key differences between the 2016 and 2020 races. First, in 2020 third-party candidates have received little attention, whereas in that 2016 poll the Libertarian (Johnson) was polling at 6% and the Green (Stein) was at 2%. Second, an increasing proportion of the electorate is casting their vote prior to election day, reducing the potential for undecided voters. Third, evaluating whether or not to retain an incumbent is intrinsically different than deciding which of two non-incumbents to elect, leading to fewer truly undecided voters in the late days of the campaign. And last, this cycle voters aren’t needing to evaluate late-breaking news from the FBI Director casting doubts on one of the candidates.

As such, 48 hours out from the election, it seems increasingly likely that Biden will become President, in a world where the election tallies accurately reflect the voting intentions of every eligible voter who believes they voted.

I crafted that italicized phrase carefully, as there are lots of different ways in which things can go wrong in the process of tabulating election results.

For instance, as difficult as this would be to imagine had we not already lived through it, we’ve had one Presidential election whose outcome can reasonably be attributed to a “ballot design” problem, in which the ballot used in one county of an unusually close state was misleading to voters and caused them to vote for the wrong candidate. Quoting from the abstract of an article published in the American Political Science Review in 2001: “We show that the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County, Florida, in the 2000 presidential election caused more than 2,000 Democratic voters to vote by mistake for Reform candidate Pat Buchanan, a number larger than George W. Bush’s certified margin of victory in Florida.”

Another way in which in theory the process could go wrong is if the election tallies included the votes of ineligible voters, and those inappropriately counted votes were determinative to the outcome in one or more states. I imagine we’ll be hearing Republicans talk about “voter fraud” next week and beyond, particularly since the President has previously claimed that millions of fraudulent votes had been tabulated for his opponent in 2016, even though there seems to be little to no evidence for the concept.

And then of course there’s the theoretical possibility of interference in electoral tabulations by hackers, and the theoretical possibility of outright fraud by election officers. I am by nature a trusting soul so I’m not going to worry myself with such phantoms, but your mileage might vary, gentle reader.

No, the theme for 2020 with respect to breakdowns in the electoral process is very likely going to center around the concept of, votes that were legitimately cast under the rules in effect at the time but are not ultimately counted due to judicial action. As I had mentioned in yesterday’s post, much of this litigation activity reflects a belief by Republicans that certain actions taken by election officials to modify voting processes are inherently in violation of Article II Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, to the extent that said actions were not enacted via state legislation.

This morning I woke up to the news that Republicans in Texas had just filed suit to invalidate over 127,000 votes that had been cast in Harris County (Houston) using “drive-thru voting” process, under the grounds that existing Texas law only authorizes the use of drive-thru voting for voters with disabilities. My understanding is that this drive-thru voting process includes the exact same voter identification procedures that would occur with normal in-person voting. As such it is difficult to make any case that this lawsuit is intended to combat “voter fraud”. Instead it represents an attempt to de-franchise people in a heavily Democratic area who believe they have already validly voted, and who may be unable to vote in person on election day even if they were to learn by then that their previous vote was to be thrown out.

Fortunately the Texas Supreme Court this afternoon rejected the request to throw out these ballots, but tomorrow morning there will be a hearing in Federal Court where the U.S. Constitutional issue becomes potentially germane. More to come, not just in Texas but surely elsewhere.

Finally, and sadly, there are increasing worries about the potential for violence in the wake of the election. Yesterday I had missed a very disturbing story out of Texas, where there is video of a so-called “Trump Train” of pickups waving Trump flags that appears to have tried to run a Biden/Harris campaign bus off the road, leading the Biden campaign to cancel three planned campaign events that day out of safety concerns. Naturally, the President approvingly tweeted a video of the incident with the phrase “I LOVE TEXAS!”, and the Texas GOP chair refers to coverage of the incident as “fake news and propaganda.” What marvelous times these are.

Election 2020: Day -3

Within the past 24 hours the Presidential election has hit about as close to home as it’s going to get, where here by ‘home’ I mean Woodbury MN, the suburb of St. Paul where we have a house and where my wife is registered to vote. (I’m still registered to vote in Chicago, where we own a condo.)

First, as I noted yesterday both Presidential candidates made appearances in locations a comfortable driving distance of the house: Biden at the state fairgrounds parking lot in St. Paul, and Trump at the Rochester MN airport. This happened on the same day that Minnesota set a new daily record for newly reported COVID-19 cases, exceeding 3000 new cases for the first day ever.

Trump originally had intended to have a full rally at a private business site half an hour west of Rochester. However Minnesota does currently have a restriction on public gatherings in excess of 250 people, and in the end Trump’s event complied with that requirement (although hundreds more supporters lined fences in an attempt to get a glimpse of the President). Trump was clearly livid, though, criticizing not only his opponent but also Minnesota Governor Walz and Minnesota Attorney General Ellison, both of whom are Democrats.

I know we’ve gotten inured to the things this President says on a daily basis, and they’ve ceased being shocking. But, since I’m writing for posterity here to commemorate these times, let’s pause and remember that four days before the election, in a public event at a state he’s probably going to lose, the President of the United States said this: “Keith Ellison and Joe Biden want to imprison you in your homes while letting anarchists, agitators and vandals roam free as they try to destroy your cities and states.” And this: “Biden is a grimy, sleazy and corrupt career politician.” And this: “Under the Biden lockdown, which he talks about and cherishes, countless Americans will die from suicide, drug overdoses and deferred medical care at a level like you haven’t seen before. There will be no school, no graduations, no weddings, no Thanksgiving, no Christmas, no 4th of July, no Easter, no nothing. There will be no future for America’s youth.”

Second, this morning Tiffany Trump was hosting an official ‘Breakfast with Tiffany’ campaign event in Woodbury, and the event was taking place at our favorite restaurant in Minnesota’s 9th-largest city, Angelina’s Kitchen. Naturally, some of the locals are calling for a boycott of the restaurant. While I am a big believer in the notion of taking a business-owner’s political views into account when determining whether to patronize a business, personally I’m going to give them a pass here. It’s hard to criticize a restaurant owner for looking for any possible source of incremental revenue during these difficult times. And besides, if I stopped patronizing Angelina’s Kitchen, I don’t know where else I’d want to go in this exurb to eat…

COVID-19 continues to be the big story three days out from the election, even if President Trump continues to assert at every opportunity, as he said yesterday in Rochester, that we’re “rounding the turn on the pandemic with or without the vaccine.” This afternoon British Prime Minister Johnson announced new plans for a four-week lockdown throughout England, although schools will remain open. The school district in Woodbury MN announced yesterday that students in grades 6-12 will shift from a hybrid model to distance learning in mid-November, due to worsening case rate numbers in the county; for now my 3rd-grade stepson will continue to be in a hybrid model, but that may need to change at some point. The U.S. death count has remained fairly steady over September and October, with the 7-day average remaining in the range of 700-800 deaths per day, but in recent days that average has again drifted up above the 800 mark. The U.S. case count has reached levels not previously seen, with a new daily case count record set two days ago and then broken yesterday.

Nothing earth-shattering in the past 24 hours in terms of political polls. There is an interesting new article from FiveThirtyEight that tries to put some order around the critical question of, when can we expect each state’s vote count to be reasonably complete? They’ve put the states into three buckets based on how much of that state’s vote we should expect will be counted/reported on election night itself: “nearly all”, “most but not some”, or “only some”. Some highlights of their classification:

  • Nearly all includes Florida. Nebraska is also here, which should give us early clarity on Omaha’s single electoral vote. New Hampshire is the only other state in this category where the Presidential race is in modest doubt. However Montana, of interest for its Senate race, is here.
  • Most but not all includes all the Midwestern states of interest (IA, MI, MN, OH, WI), the non-Florida Southern states of interest (GA, NC, TX), and also Arizona and Colorado.
  • Only some includes all-important Pennsylvania, as well as Nevada.

Election 2020: Day -4

I’ll start with a couple of pieces of Minnesota-related news today, which tends to catch my eye since it’s the state in which my wife is registered to vote.

First, this afternoon both Trump and Biden are holding events in Minnesota, Biden in St. Paul (a drive-in rally at the state fairgrounds) and Trump in Rochester (with a 250-person attendance limit due to current state limitations on public gatherings). I’d commented previously that Minnesota is one of the few states where Trump is on the offense, although polling and modeling suggests that by now Trump’s chances of winning the state are somewhere between slim (FiveThirtyEight thinks 7%) and none (The Economist thinks <1%).

That makes me wonder, what is Biden seeing that makes him want to invest the time to stop in Minnesota, even if it is conveniently wedged between other Upper Midwest stops today? The Senate race has been not been viewed as particularly competitive, even before Republican challenger Jason Lewis’ recent health issues. Perhaps he’s trying to help boost Democrats’ chances of flipping the Minnesota state senate, in the hopes of giving the party total control of the state going into a post-census redistricting year? (Right now Minnesota is an increasingly-rare example of a state where the Governor and House are in one party’s hands while the Senate is controlled by the other party.) It’s a bit of a head-scratcher.

Second, last night the 8th Circuit ruled that any Minnesota mail-in ballots received after 8pm on election day will need to be set aside, in order to preserve the ability for later litigation to determine whether or not they should be counted. This is part of a theme of Republican election-related litigation across multiple states, arguing that changes to election rules by state administrative officials that were not ratified by state legislatures violate Article II Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. (As such, it seems possible that these ballots might eventually get counted with respect to state races, but not with respect to federal races). There is a fascinating legal question here about what the meaning of the word “Legislature” in the U.S. Constitution is; however it is regrettable that this legal argument has only become so visible mere days before an election that is generally acknowledged to be exceptionally important.

In non-Minnesota news, early voting levels in Texas have already exceeded the total number of ballots cast in 2016, with today being the last day for early voting under Texas law. This sounds astonishing. However, I was surprised to learn that almost three-quarters of the total votes cast in Texas in 2016 came through early voting.

In yesterday’s post I threw around some numbers from FiveThirtyEight‘s election models. There’s another widely publicized probabilistic election model floating around, from The Economist. I thought it would be interesting to compare and contrast how these two models are viewing the key races with 4 days to go. As such I pulled some data from both websites within minutes of each other, mid-afternoon on day -4, and here’s what I found.

President. Economist is more bullish than 538 about Biden’s overall chances, with Biden at 96% to win, versus 90% now (up from 88% yesterday) for 538.

I think a major driver of the difference is how the two models view Pennsylvania. While 538 has Biden’s chances in PA at 86%, Economist has Biden at 94%. And as discussed in yesterday’s post, Pennsylvania appears to be a very critical state.

A related driver is that 538 seems to see greater chances of Trump prevailing in several other states that both models view as strong Biden states, like New Hampshire (Economist 98%, 538 89%), Minnesota (Economist >99%, 538 93%), Nevada (Economist 94%, 538 90%), Michigan (Economist 98%, 538 96%), and Wisconsin (Economist 97%, 538 94%).

When it comes to the true battleground states, the two models’ views are fairly well-aligned, but again there’s some tendency for the Economist’s model to compress probabilities towards the likelier outcome. All numbers here are expressed in terms of Biden’s probability of winning:

  • Florida: Economist 77%, 538 66%
  • Arizona: Economist 76%, 538 69%
  • North Carolina: Economist 70%, 538 66%
  • Georgia: Economist 58%, 538 58%
  • Iowa: Economist 45%, 538 46%
  • Ohio: Economist 38%, 538 45%
  • Texas: Economist 26%, 538 35%

Unfortunately the Economist’s model does not appear to produce a forecast for Nebraska’s 2nd District, which as discussed in yesterday’s post could possibly be important in some scenarios; the 538 model currently has this as Biden 78%.

Senate. Similarly, The Economist is a little more bullish than FiveThirtyEight about the Democrats’ chances of prevailing.

There are several races where there’s general agreement about what’s going to happen, but the 538 model is less certain about the outcome than the Economist model. All numbers here are expressed in terms of the probability of the seat flipping parties:

  • Alabama (D-Jones): Economist 99%, 538 81%
  • Colorado (R-Gardner): Economist 95%, 538 85%
  • Arizona (R-McSally): Economist 88%, 538 81%
  • Mississippi (R-Hyde-Smith): Economist 9%, 538 14%
  • Michigan (D-Peters): Economist 4%, 538 17%
  • Minnesota (D-Smith): Economist 2%, 538 7%

On the other hand the two models are aligned with respect to New Mexico’s open Democratic seat, as well as McConnell’s seat in Kentucky, thinking there’s only a 3% to 5% chance either of those seats will flip.

For most of the seats that are in greater doubt, in general The Economist’s model likes the Democrats’ chances better than FiveThirtyEight’s model. Again all numbers below are expressed in terms of the probability of the seat flipping parties:

  • North Carolina (R-Tillis): Economist 72%, 538 63%
  • Maine (R-Collins): Economist 71%, 538 59%
  • Georgia (R-Perdue): Economist 60%, 538 42%
  • Iowa (R-Ernst): Economist 57%, 538 54%
  • South Carolina (R-Graham): Economist 35%, 538 23%
  • Texas (R-Cornyn): Economist 20%, 538 14%

One exception here is Montana (R-Daines), where both models have the seat at 34% to flip. And then there’s the second seat in Georgia, Loeffler’s seat. As I mentioned yesterday, this “jungle general” seat appears destined to go to a runoff, between Warnock (D) and either Loeffler (R) or Collins (R). As such, trying to forecast what’s going to happen here seems particularly difficult, as you’d need to forecast voter enthusiasm for the runoff election, which could depend on how important the outcome is or isn’t with respect to the total Senate picture. Both models have this seat in the 60-63% range to flip, but I would take that with even more of a grain of salt than the other predictions.

All told, the two models generate fairly similar aggregate conclusions: The Economist thinks the Democrats are at 82% to recapture Senate control, while FiveThirtyEight has the Democrats at 77%.

Election 2020: Day -5

We in the US are entering a very interesting period: “Election Day” is now only five days away, but there seems to be little chance that the night of the election will bring any sense of finality the way it has traditionally (2000 aside) — not with uncertainties about when mail-in and early votes will be counted in which states, compounded with uncertainties about the potential transition of power. I don’t know if we’re entering “Election Week”, or “Election Month”, or “Election Quarter”.

As such I thought it would be a suitable time to start recording my perspectives on these events as they unfold, to have something to look back upon. Since this is the first post in a planned series, I need to start by sharing the context of our times.

The generally accepted wisdom is that Biden is a heavy favorite to win the Presidency; not a prohibitive favorite like Reagan in 1984, but certainly in a better position than Clinton was against Trump four years earlier. On average, national polls show Biden with a 9-point lead, although there are outlier polls; for instance Rasmussen, which has consistently exhibited a ‘house edge’ towards Trump, has the national race as Biden +1 today versus Trump +1 three days ago. Due to clumping in how Biden’s vote is distributed, Trump is felt to have a similar structural advantage in the Electoral College to what he had four years ago, when a Trump -2 result in the nationwide vote converted to 306 electoral votes.

Moving to the Electoral College calculus, Biden appears to have two main paths to winning – what Nate Silver referred to in an article yesterday as Plan A1 and Plan A2. Plan A1, which has gotten more attention, is: flip Pennsylvania. Biden has had a consistent polling lead in his birth state, which went Trump +0.7 in 2016; the current polling average is Biden +5. If Biden wins Pennsylvania, it appears to be very difficult for Trump to get to 270 electoral votes.

Plan A2 is: flip Arizona, and also the Omaha congressional district (NE-2). Arizona went Trump +3.5 in 2016, but the state has been changing; the Democrats captured a Senate seat in 2018 and the current polling average is Biden +3.5. Omaha’s sole electoral vote (Nebraska being one of two states that is not winner-take-all) went Trump +2 in 2016, but what little polling has been done specific to that district has shown Biden leads of 7 to 11 points, and FiveThirtyEight’s current forecast for the district is Biden +6. One can construct a plausible map in which Trump wins Pennsylvania and otherwise has a good night, but Biden wins Arizona and Omaha to pull out a 270-268 victory. Which helps explain why Trump took the time two days ago to do one of his trademark rallies in Omaha, only 7 days before the election.

But of course there are plenty of other states in play. For starters, it seems increasingly likely that Biden will flip both Wisconsin and Michigan. Wisconsin had unexpectedly gone Trump +1 in 2016, but there was a credible poll yesterday that had it at Biden +17. While that may be an overbid – FiveThirtyEight’s forecast is currently Biden +8 – the reality is that Wisconsin is currently one of the very worst states in the country with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, and that is surely hurting Trump’s chances there. That same poll had Michigan, which unexpectedly went Trump +0.25 in 2016, as Biden +7. This is very consistent with what other polls have shown throughout the campaign, and FiveThirtyEight’s current forecast for Michigan is Biden +8.

More interestingly, there are several states that Trump won in 2016 where things seem very tight: Florida, Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas. If any of these break for Biden then Trump’s chances would be slim. Silver recently referred to these as Biden’s “multiple Plan Cs”. While Trump has attempted to play some offense in states that went for Clinton in 2016 – Minnesota, Nevada, and New Hampshire – the contour of the campaign has largely been Biden on offense and Trump on defense. If everything breaks in Biden’s favor, it’s possible to imagine him getting over 400 electoral votes.

However all of this model-driven speculation, while fun, ignores some important dynamics. Early voting and mail-in voting are both at levels not previously seen, due to a combination of voter enthusiasm and concerns about in-person voting due to the pandemic. This raises the usual level of questions about whether pollsters have accurately captured this year’s electorate. But in addition, there will be tremendous inconsistency across states as to which type of votes will be tallied when; and this has the risk of impacting the public perception of what is actually happening in a given state’s election results.

It is easy to imagine a scenario where, given a state’s election procedures, and given differences between the parties’ electorates with respect to voting method, one candidate appears to be ahead on election night but the other candidate ultimately takes a lead that is outside the mandatory recount threshold. Would the public accept such a result as legitimate, or would they suspect that hanky-panky by electoral officials occurred? These public perception concerns have been exacerbated by comments already made by both President Trump and SCOTUS Justice Kavanaugh, suggesting that this type of situation inherently raises questions about the legitimacy of the electoral process.

So, we may be in for a long haul here, with no clear winner established on the night of the election, with results coming in over days if not weeks, and with considerable potential for judicial activity not just in one state (as in 2000) but in multiple states simultaneously.

And then there are also Senate and House elections to consider. It is generally agreed that the Democrats will retain control of the House, with most observers believing they have an opportunity to expand their majority. The Senate landscape in 2020 did not initially look promising for the Democrats, who need a net gain of 3 seats to get to 50. The conventional wisdom in mid-summer was that while there was a clear path for the Democrats to win the seats in Arizona (McSally), Colorado (Gardner), and Maine (Collins), it was very likely that the Democrats would lose their windfall seat (from the Roy Moore debacle) in Alabama (Jones), and it was far from clear what other seat could successfully be put in play.

However, much has happened since then; and while it could easily still all go wrong for the Democrats and they could end at 49 (or even lower, e.g., if Collins pulls off a comeback), right now the modal outcome of FiveThirtyEight’s forecast is a tie between 51 and 52 Democratic seats. Republican incumbents in Alaska (Sullivan), Georgia (Perdue), Iowa (Ernst), Montana (Daines), North Carolina (Tillis), and South Carolina (Graham) are all in much tighter-than-expected races. In addition there’s a close race in Kansas for an open seat, and the “jungle general” race in Georgia to fill the remainder of Loeffler’s term appears destined to go to a runoff between the Democrat Warnock and either Loeffler or Republican Congressman Collins. And even states like Kentucky (McConnell), Mississippi (Hyde-Smith), and Texas (Cornyn) no longer look completely safe for the incumbent, although the same could be said in the other direction for Michigan (Peters), where the African-American Republican challenger could create some ballot-splitting.

As such there will be quite a bit to watch for outside of the Presidential election, including the possibility that Senate control could hinge on a runoff election in Georgia. And there will also be the usual array of state-level actions to follow; of particular interest to me is the so-called “fair tax” amendment in Illinois, which seeks to overturn a clause in the state constitution that prohibits graduated tax rates.

Bug Jack Barron and “Poli-Sci-Fi”

Like many children of the 1980s, I grew up reading heavy doses of science fiction; although I was perhaps a bit unusual in that my tastes ran more to short stories than to novels, and more to the Golden Age than to the New Wave or cyberpunk.   Clarke and Asimov were my lodestones at first, and while my tastes later expanded to the likes of Sturgeon and Heinlein, I never quite made the leap to appreciate Ellison and his contemporaries, or their progeny.

Every rule has its exception, of course.  And in my case, one piece of New Wave science fiction to which I was exposed and immediately loved was Norman Spinrad’s Nebula-nominated 1969 short story, “The Big Flash.”   The story’s writing style captured my attention, to be sure:  It is written from a first-person perspective, except that every few pages the narrative shifts to a different person’s perspective (without repetition).  But it was really the subject matter of the story and, more generally, the subgenre of the story that captured my interest:  “The Big Flash” is a stellar example of what one might call political science fiction, which for short I’ll call poli-sci-fi.

Now, there are different things one could mean by poli-sci-fi.  It could mean speculative fiction involving political science themes, but without an evident “science fiction” element as that term is generally understood.  A good example (in my opinion) of this type of poli-sci-fi would be Tom Clancy’s Jack Ryan novels viewed as a whole, up through 2000’s The Bear and The Dragon, by which point Clancy had constructed an alternate present that was clearly distinguishable from our present due to different geopolitical choices made during the period 1985-2000.  (And then he went and ruined his own universe, by implausibly assuming in 2003’s The Teeth of the Tiger that 9/11 would have happened anyways in the Ryanverse, at which point I stopped paying any attention to Clancy.)  Of course one doesn’t typically recognize the Ryan novels as being “science fiction” and instead views them through alternate genre lenses – such as “spy fiction”, or “military fiction”.  But to me the poli-sci-fi frame is compelling, particularly after considering the events taking place after the deus ex machina conclusion to Debt of Honor thrusting massive political change upon the USA.  Another well-known example of this type of poli-sci-fi would be Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale.

An alternate definition of poli-sci-fi that might be more widely accepted would be speculative fiction that explores technological change primarily from the perspective of its political implications.  In other words, fiction that everyone would recognize as “science fiction” but where political ideas are paramount.   Huxley’s Brave New World or Orwell’s 1984 would clearly fit here.  As does “The Big Flash,” which was set in the then-present (i.e., the USA of the late 1960s) and explored the following question:  Given that tactical nuclear weapons had recently become technologically feasible, how could one create conditions under which their use in the Vietnam War would be embraced by the American people?  I wouldn’t want to deprive the reader of the experience of finding out how Spinrad answered that question, but I will mention that the first time I heard Blue Oyster Cult’s “Don’t Fear The Reaper” after having read “The Big Flash” was a very odd experience…

“The Big Flash” was not the high point of Spinrad’s 1969 literary output, however.  That honor technically goes to Bug Jack Barron, his best-known novel and one that fits very snugly into the second definition of poli-sci-fi above.  I say “technically” because Bug Jack Barron had actually been completed in 1967, but was serialized in New Worlds magazine in 1967-68 due it having been rejected by Spinrad’s publisher, before finally seeing print as a novel in 1969.

I read Bug Jack Barron for the first time this month, having stumbled across it on sale at my local independent bookstore.   And like “The Big Flash”, its plot centers around a question involving the intersection of scientific progress with contemporary American politics:  Should Congress pass a bill granting a monopoly on human cryogenics to a nominally not-for-profit Foundation for Human Immortality, which charges $500,000 to freeze one’s body upon death (with the deceased hoping that future life-extension research would eventually enable resurrection)?

It was, without doubt, a highly controversial book when it was first published, and understandably so – copious amounts of explicit sexual content and drug references, very liberal use of the c-word and the n-word, experimental sentence structure, et cetera.  It’s hard for me to completely appreciate how shocking it would have been to read in 1967; it would still offend a lot of sensibilities in 2015.   And while it was acclaimed at the time (garnering a Hugo nomination but losing to LeGuin’s The Left Hand of Darkness), there’s plenty about the novel that one could criticize, even leaving aside the more controversial elements.

But even so, there are a number of interesting political musings in the novel.  At the time the novel was written Spinrad was speculating about the future, but from our perspective the world of Bug Jack Barron represents an alternate past; and it’s intriguing to step back and evaluate what Spinrad got “wrong” and what he got “right” in extrapolating forward from his 1967.

The timeframe of the novel is never explicitly stated, but there a number of clues.  We’re told that the next US Presidential nominating conventions are a little over a year away as the novel opens; that our protagonist, Jack Barron, is 38 and first came to prominence as a “Berkeley rabble-rouser”; and that a 1981-model car is considered old.   Putting those pieces together, it appears to me that the novel very likely takes place in the spring of 1987.

But this 1987 is one in which the USA has been in a prolonged state of single-party rule – a premise that was already obsolete by the time the novel was published.  In Spinrad’s 1987, the Republicans have not managed to elect a President since Eisenhower.  (Reagan is mentioned in the novel, in passing, as an example of a media figure who successfully turned to politics.)  The current Democratic president is unnamed but apparently isn’t standing for re-election; one of the leading Democratic candidates for President is referred to throughout the novel as “Teddy the Pretender”, which could very well be a veiled reference to Teddy Kennedy.  Moreover, Spinrad’s 1987 is one in which the USA is no longer a two-party state.  Spinrad posits that a new party, the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), has emerged to the left of the Democrats, as an outgrowth of the protest movements of 1960s; our protagonist Barron was one of the founders of the SJC.

Living in the world we do, where the civil rights movement of 1960s led to the transformation of the Republican party’s base via the Southern strategy and to 20 years of Republican presidents over a 24-year period (1968-1992), it’s a little hard for Spinrad’s vision of the future political landscape to be resonant.  However, was it a crazy idea?  Not necessarily.  If you grant the conceit that the hippies and African-American civil rights activists could have transformed their activities into a new political party separate from the Democrats, then it becomes easier to imagine that working-class whites (particularly in the South) would have remained in the Democratic fold and that the Republicans would have remained primarily the party of moneyed interests.  (Another main character in the novel is the African-American SJC governor of Mississippi, which seems to imply that the SJC garners essentially all of the African-American vote.)  Indeed, Spinrad’s version of American politics as having a dominant centrist party flanked by smaller parties on each side of the spectrum is far from unfamiliar: We just have to look north of the border, to the Liberal Party (or, as they were often referred, the “natural governing party” of Canada), who were in power for all but one year over the period 1963-1984.

In imagining a USA in which there is a flourishing progressive party to the Democrats’ left and a struggling Republican party, Spinrad was anticipating that the country as a whole would settle further to the left on the political spectrum than it did in reality.  This viewpoint is reflected in two other aspects of Spinrad’s 1987 that seem strange today.

One involves marijuana legalization.  In the novel, not only had marijuana become legal in almost 40 states by 1987, but it had become big business: The major sponsor of the most popular TV program in the USA is a brand of marijuana cigarette called Acapulco Golds.  Moreover, regular marijuana usage by major political and public figures is presented as being normal.  While in our 2015 we can start to see that type of future as being plausible, it’s certainly a far cry from how marijuana was regarded in our 1987.

The other involves the role of regulation in overseeing the media and political debate.  The novel assumes, as a matter of course, that the Federal Communications Commission would continue to ensure that each media outlet remained comparatively free from political bias, via what was known as the fairness doctrine.  Barron, while formerly an SJC political figure, had abandoned politics prior to the start of the novel and instead is the host of a current affairs TV show, and he and his staff are constantly concerned about the need to present matters in a way that will keep the FCC off the network’s back.  Ironically, in reality the FCC abandoned the fairness doctrine in….1987, thereby paving the way for today’s partisan media climate.  Barron is also continuously worried about potential accusations of libel for statements made on his TV show, which is interesting from a contemporary perspective, inasmuch as that I can’t recall the last time I heard anybody in the USA (as opposed to the UK) express concerns about libel.

Along similar lines, the central political debate of the novel involves a tension between capitalist and socialist values – a tension that would have been far more one-sided in our 1987.  The fact that the Foundation for Human Immortality requires $500,000 of liquid assets in order to purchase a space in one of its “freezers” is quite controversial.  The principal alternative under discussion is not, as one might think from today’s perspective, to deny the Foundation its monopoly in order to encourage competition in the field of human cryogenics.  Rather, it is to nationalize the cryogenics facilities, so that wealth would not be a mechanism for triaging access.  (I don’t imagine that Spinrad would have foreseen either the high inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s or the rise of Wall Street in the 1980s, so his $500,000 threshold probably seemed more insurmountable at the time then it does to those of us who lived through the 1980s.)  Unsurprisingly, Spinrad doesn’t really discuss what triage mechanisms the proponents of the alternative “public freezer bill” might suggest employing.

But not all of Spinrad’s extrapolations missed the mark.

One of the central themes of the novel is the potentially corruptive influence of money on politics.  The not-for-profit Foundation for Human Immortality is controlled by a billionaire who uses his purse-strings to control senators, governors, and FCC commissioners – with the ultimate objective (for reasons discussed below) being to control the next President.  As the jacket blurb to the 2004 paperback edition of the novel reads, in trying to summarize the novel’s appeal in a single sentence:  “[Bug Jack Barron‘s] exploration of how big business corrupts the democratic process is as relevant as ever to today’s television and media obsesses culture.”

Another recurring theme in the novel is race relations.  Spinrad’s 1987 is hardly a post-racial paradise.  Although Mississippi spent money to build “a new capital for a new Mississippi” and named it Evers, the new city contained “some of the ghastliest slums Barron had ever seen … [and] made Harlem, Watts, Bedford-Stuyvesant look like Scarsdale.”  The governor of Mississippi takes it as an undeniable fact of life that he can never aspire to the Presidency due to his skin color, and therefore resigns himself to projecting his ambitions on sympathetic whites (or “black shades” as he calls them).  And even though the viability of the SJC depends on fusing the interests of progressive whites with African-Americans, there is still evident tension between the white and black wings of the party.  And, interestingly, Spinrad foresaw that African-Americans would reclaim the n-word.   None of this sounds all that unfamiliar.

One last final political element of Bug Jack Barron worth noting is a plot point about separation-of-powers concerns.  The piece of proposed legislation that is the main subject of the book would establish a 5-member Presidential Commission to oversee all of the activities of the Foundation of Human Immortality and regulate the field of life-extension.  This specific legal framework is exceptionally important to the billionaire overseer of the Foundation; his ultimate intent is, by virtue of controlling the President and hence his appointments to the Commission, to get the Commission to sanction certain Foundation activities that would otherwise be illegal, without risking Congressional interference.   Although the technical details are somewhat inapposite, it’s interesting to note that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a similar commission to regulate the accounting industry (the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and that there was a 2009 Supreme Court case calling into question the constitutionality of that scheme.

All in all, Bug Jack Barron is a somewhat dated but nonetheless worthwhile read for those who are interested in poli-sci-fi (and willing to tolerate copious amounts of vulgar language!)