Back in the U.S. for a week, between summer trips to Canada and Croatia.

In my last post I noted that Trump had been making noise about possible U.S. intervention in the Iran-Israel War that had just broken out. On Thursday the White House Press Secretary said that Trump would decide “within the next two weeks” on whether or not the U.S. would bomb Iran. That prompted the New York Times to remind the world of the many, many times that Trump had said an issue would be addressed in “two weeks” only for it to vanish:

“Two weeks for Mr. Trump can mean something, or nothing at all. It is both a yes and a no. It is delaying while at the same time scheduling. It is not an objective unit of time, it is a subjective unit of time. It is completely divorced from any sense of chronology. It simply means later. But later can also mean never. Sometimes.”

Indeed, the “two weeks” reminded many people of another principle that has become a common refrain in recent weeks, TACO: Trump Always Chickens Out.

In that context, it came as quite a surprise Saturday evening when word came out that the U.S. had, indeed, attacked three Iranian nuclear facilities using stealth bombers and submarine-launched cruise missiles. This attack represents the first-ever use of a 21st century U.S. weapon called the Massive Ordinance Protector, which can only be delivered by American B-2 bombers, and which was designed to strike deep underground targets like Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at Fordow.

While it’s still very early, this news bears monitoring along at least three major dimensions.

First, the direct foreign policy implications: To what extent does this represent a “one and done” event versus a harbinger of greater U.S. intervention in the Iranian conflict, and to what extent can and will Iran and its allies retaliate against the U.S.?

Second, the implications on Republican politics: Given that Trump clearly positioned himself as the anti-war candidate and swore off foreign interventionism in favor of his “America First” policy, to what extent does this action splinter the MAGA coalition?

Third, the implications for Congress: To what extent do the Trump’s actions violate the War Powers Act, and what is Congress willing to do about that? Some on the left are already arguing that the Iranian bombing constitutes an impeachable offense.

In other news, the Senate Parliamentarian has started making rulings about which provisions of OBBBA can and cannot be included in a budget reconciliation bill requiring only a bare majority instead of a 60-vote majority. To my surprise, the Parliamentarian has blessed a revised version of a controversial provision that would place a 10-year moratorium on enforcing state and local AI legislation; in order to pass muster, the provision has been revised in the Senate to make the moratorium a condition for states for receive federal broadband expansion funds, thus creating a suitable connection to budgetary concerns.

As expected based on oral arguments, a 9th Circuit panel ruled 3-0 in favor of the administration in Newsom v. Trump, overturning the temporary restraining order issued by federal Judge Charles Breyer (the younger brother of retired Justice Breyer). Importantly, the 9th Circuit did not endorse the government’s position that there was no place for judicial review of the President’s decision to federalize the National Guard. On Friday Judge Breyer had been expected to hold a hearing on Governor Newsom’s request for a preliminary injunction, but now Breyer appears to have some doubts as to whether that injunction request should be filed in his court or directly with the 9th Circuit, so he called for briefing due tomorrow on that procedural question.

In other judicial news, SCOTUS did not grant the plaintiffs’ request for expedited consideration of the Federal Circuit IEEPA tariffs case.